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ABSTRACT: 
There has not been a retreat but a transformation of the state, involving significant changes in both 
the public sphere of politics and the so-called private sphere of economic activity, and in their 
modes of  interaction, especially law. The privatization of state-owned assets and the reduction of 
direct state economic intervention have not led to a reduced role of the state but to changes in its 
form, involving new types of formalized regulation, the fragmentation of the public sphere, the 
decentring of the state and the emergence of multi-level governance. This has been complemented 
by the increased salience of `private’ regulation, so that in many ways the apparently private 
sphere of economic activity has become more public. In fact, there has been a complex process of 
interaction with a blurring of the divisions between apparently private and public regulation. 
Despite talk of deregulation there has been extensive reregulation, or formalization of regulation, 
and the emergence of global regulatory networks, intermingling the public and the private. The 
transition from government to governance means a lack of a clear hierarchy of norms, a blurring of 
distinctions between hard and soft law, and a fragmentation of public functions entailing a 
resurgence of technocracy. The increasingly important role for regulation in global governance 
undermines the formalist view of law’s legitimacy as deriving from national state political 
structures, and requires new approaches to articulating normative interactions that are more 
conducive to democratic deliberation, in order to establish the public interest firmly as the prime 
concern in all forms of management of economic activity.?  
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1. INTRODUCTION: FROM GOVERNMENT TO GOVERNANCE 
The term governance has come into increased use, generally to describe changes in governing 
processes from hierarchy to polyarchy. In international relations theory, it denotes the management 
of world affairs in the absence of a global government (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992), hence the 
term `global governance’ has become commonplace. For theorists of the state it refers to the 
`hollowing out’ of the unitary state, or the decentring of government, and the shift to `governing 
without government’ (Rhodes 1997).  
Two interrelated processes seem to have been involved, over the past 30 years. First, there have 
been major changes in both the political or `public’ sphere of the state and the `private’ sphere of 
firms, industry and other social institutions, as well as in the relationships between the two.  
The most visible aspect has been the privatization of much of what was previously regarded as the 
public or political sphere, resulting from the sale of state-owned firms and assets, the introduction 
of contracting into public arenas, and the delegation of a range of activities (from waste disposal to 
the running of prisons) to service providers. Conversely, however, there has been a parallel and 
complementary trend, much less noticed or analysed, in which the apparently `private’ sphere of 
economic activity has become more public. The corporations and business networks which 
dominate the so-called `market’, even as they urge a reduction in intrusive state controls, find their 
activities governed by an increasing plethora of various types of regulation. Indeed, the biggest 
paradox has been the growth of industry and corporate codes of conduct, the private sector 
adopting public standards for itself, although this has generally been in response to pressures from 
their customers, workers and suppliers, and sometimes in order to forestall the imposition of legal 
obligations (Haufler 2001, Picciotto 2003).  
The second and interrelated process has entailed transformations in the international coordination 
of governance. In the classical liberal model of the international system, states were recognized as 
interdependent, but coordination was primarily through governments, which had exclusive 
legitimate powers internally, and were allowed considerable scope to decide how to use those 
powers to fulfil their international obligations. In this system, national law was the primary form 
of governing private economic activity, and governments could insulate their internal management 
of the national economy from external forces and shocks by controlling cross-border flows of 
money and commodities. However, as the demands on government have become greater, national 
economic management has become more difficult and complex. At the same time, international 
economic liberalization since the mid-1970s has entailed the substantial removal of border barriers 
(tariffs and currency controls), greatly reinforcing the movement towards deeper international 
economic integration. But this shift towards more `open’ national economies did not create a 
unified and free world market. Instead, like an outgoing tide, it revealed a craggy landscape of 
diverse national and local regulations. Trying to deal with these differences has generated an 
exponential growth of networks of regulatory cooperation, coordination and harmonization. These 
are no longer primarily of an international character, but also supranational and infranational, 
frequently by-passing central government. They also reflect and reinforce changing public-private 
forms, since these regulatory networks are very often neither clearly state nor private but of a 
hybrid nature. Indeed, a major reason for the growth of corporate and industry codes has been 
concerns that state-based regulation is ineffective and leaves too many gaps (Haufler 2001, 114-5). 
Thus, there has been a movement from the classical liberal international state system, towards one 
that is often denounced as neo-liberal, but is perhaps better described as post-liberal. The next 
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section will sketch out some of the main elements of these changes. The third section will analyze 
three main problematic features of the new landscape: the destabilization of normative hierarchies, 
the blurring of distinctions between normative forms, and the political problems caused by the 
fragmentation of statehood accompanied by the growth of technocratic governance. The final 
section will consider the role of the law and lawyers in managing global regulatory networks, 
based on a brief overview of some of the main recent theoretical contributions to this question. 
2. DILEMMAS OF THE POST-LIBERAL STATE SYSTEM 
Changing Public-Private Forms and Relations 
The thrust of privatization since the 1980s, led in Europe by the UK followed by others such as 
Germany and France, entailed the withdrawal of states from direct involvement in economic 
activity, in particular by sales of state-owned firms and assets. Privatization appeared to be part of 
a wider move away from state-centred direction of the economy, especially as it was powered by 
anti-statist ideas and accompanied by much talk of deregulation and free markets. There were 
indeed pressures and proposals to restructure administrative arrangements in many states, aiming 
to dismantle state intervention. In practice, however, privatization often tended to produce little if 
any reduction of state activity, but instead changes in its form, with a shift to indirect provision of 
services within a regulatory framework (Vogel 1996, Feigenbaum et al. 1998, Prosser 2000). To 
paraphrase David Vogel (Vogel 1996), the apparent shift to `freer markets’ has meant more rules.  
At the same time, as many authors have argued, the character of regulation has significantly 
changed, away from the top-down hierarchical model of state command, towards more fluid, often 
fragmented, and interactive or `reflexive’ processes (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992, Scott 2001, 
Parker 2002, Jordana & Levi-Faur 2004). This involves a mixture of legal forms, both public and 
private, and an interplay between state and private ordering (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992). Thus, a 
private legal form such as contract can be used as a tool to achieve both managerial and policy 
objectives, either when private firms are entrusted to deliver public services, such as refuse 
collection or hospital cleaning (Vincent-Jones 1998), or even entirely within the public sector if 
quasi-markets are introduced (Vincent-Jones 1999). This is not to say that such adaptations are 
always successful. Contracts provide flexibility, but private contract law does not easily 
accommodate and may undermine the public interest safeguards developed by public or 
administrative law, for example by shielding service providers from public accountability, perhaps 
even from legislative changes, and from liability to intended beneficiaries who are not parties to 
the service contract (Freeman 2000, Collins 1999). On the other hand, public bureaucracies find it 
hard to achieve genuine responsiveness to individual citizens, although they have tried to do so by 
adopting a managerial culture of service delivery (corporate plans, customer charters, performance 
targets, etc.). Hence, some authors have argued that traditional administrative law approaches 
should be modified and find new ways of applying public norms to private actors (Aman 2002, 
Freeman 2003).  
Furthermore, the increased demands being made on the state have resulted in its fragmentation, as 
regulatory functions have increasingly been delegated to public bodies or agencies with a status 
semi-autonomous from central government. Such entities are generally not formally part of the 
government, and may be constituted as private organizations (Aquina and Bekke in Kooiman 
1992), with a mandate either laid down by public law or by private legal forms such as contract, or 
a mixture of the two. They themselves may deploy a greater variety of forms and techniques of 
regulation. In the US, which had almost no state ownership and a long tradition of regulation by 
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independent agencies, there was some criticism of `command and control’ forms of regulation for 
being excessively legalistic and adversarial (Bardach & Kagan 1982), leading to new debates and 
theories about regulation and its design (e.g. Noll 1985). This has spread to other countries 
(notably Australia), and generated debates about new approaches to `smart regulation’ 
(Gunningham & Grabosky 1998). These build on the seminal work of Ayres and Braithwaite who 
argued that business regulation should be viewed as an interactive process, involving both firms 
themselves and civil society actors, with the `big stick’ of the state being a last resort (Ayres and 
Braithwaite 1992).  
Indeed, from this broader perspective of regulation it can be seen that `private’ economic actors 
also may take on a regulatory role. As Colin Scott has pointed out, this may result from the state 
adopting a policy of `deregulation’, leaving a void which may be filled by a non-state actor: he 
cites an official inquiry into New Zealand’s telecommunications regime which concluded that `in 
the absence of state authority, the privatized company, Telecom New Zealand, had, in effect, 
become the regulator of the market’ (Scott 2001, 337). Thus, private bodies may themselves 
assume tasks which are of a public character, or entail provision of `public goods’. The role of 
private entities may even extend to controlling public as well as private activities, for example 
bond rating agencies and technical standards compliance certification institutions, both of which 
assess public as well as private entities (Scott 2002).  
Deregulation, Reregulation and Formalization  
Thus, the so-called `retreat of the state’ left a gap which was quickly filled by new institutions and 
techniques of regulation. In place of administration based on social ties within closed corporate-
state bureaucracies, new types of formalized regulation have emerged. These developments have 
been seen as a shift from the Keynesian welfare state to a `new regulatory state’ better able to deal 
with the `risk society’ (Braithwaite 2000). Thus, the state having failed to deliver on expectations 
raised by state-centric models, now has a new role of trying to maintain coherence via steering, 
since roles previously considered as those of government have been recast as societal problems 
concerning a variety of actors (Pierre 2000). Influential ideologists have argued for a redefinition 
of the role of government, to separate `steering’ from `rowing’: politicians should define aims and 
targets but subcontract delivery, which should be competitive and aim to meet the needs of 
customers (Osborne & Gabler 1992). More critically, followers of Foucault have argued that the 
state is a `mythical abstraction', without either the unity or functionality attributed to it, and 
suggested a broader understanding of `governmentality’ as involving `a proliferation of a whole 
range of apparatuses pertaining to government and a complex body of knowledges and “know-
how” about government' (Rose and Miller 1992, 175). In this light, the shift from welfarism to 
neo-liberalism means, according to Rose and Miller, that `private enterprise is opened, in so many 
ways, to the action at a distance mechanisms that have proliferated in advanced liberal 
democracies, with the rise of managers as an intermediary between expert knowledge, economic 
policy and business decisions' (ibid. 200).  
More broadly, the shift towards new forms of governance may be seen as rooted in the transition 
from the `Fordist’ model of industrial capitalism, to a post-industrial knowledge economy and 
learning society. In many ways this entails new processes of socialization of economic activity and 
de-commodification, as valorization involves far more than the sale of physical commodities. 
Thus, there has been a shift to `lifestyle’ products and the `services’ economy. At the same time, 
this has entailed pressures towards re-commodification, as seen in the very concept of the sale of 
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`services’, as well as the increased emphasis on intangible property, or intellectual property rights 
(IPRs), ranging through trademarks, copyright, patents, and confidential information. While this 
re-commodification and re-individualization may re-establish the conditions for production and 
circulation based on exchange, it also requires dense institutional networks to manage the flows of 
information and remuneration. These institutions and networks are generally of a hybrid public-
private character, for example the Rights Remuneration Organizations (RROs) that license 
activities such as the public playing of music, or the educational use of copyright works. 
The emergence of a multiplicity of forms of regulation, and the constant variation, adaptation and 
experimentation with them, may be seen to reflect the basic modernist dilemma of attempting to 
govern an increasingly complex lifeworld. This is the conclusion of Michael Moran’s study of the 
emergence of the new British regulatory state, which he describes as a roller-coaster ride of hyper-
innovation and policy disasters, `from stagnation to fiasco’ (Moran 2003, 155ff). He analyses in 
detail the sharp transition from the stagnating traditional British system of government which he 
characterises as `club rule’, developed in the 19th century essentially `to protect elites from 
democratic threats’ (ibid. 41). This culture of cooperation resting on the gentlemanly ideal 
legitimized a high degree of independence from state control, based on self-regulation throughout 
the world of corporate business, banking and finance, and the professions, which became 
institutionally embedded in 1880-1918, and endured for two-thirds of the last century. However, 
the class compromises which underpinned this system were weakened by the end of empire and 
the collapse of social cultures of deference to authority in the 1960s; its transformation was then 
precipitated by the economic crisis of the 1970s and the ensuing renewed burst of globalization.  
Thus, the British story, convincingly analysed by Moran, is one of the transformation of closed 
communities of self-regulation, in which privatization and the reduction of direct state 
management have been counter-pointed by a strong shift to the formalization and codification of 
regulation. His trenchant analysis of privatization argues that the new forms of management of 
infrastructure services emerged due to the exhaustion of both the traditional modes of public 
operation and of the regulation of private corporations, neither of which provided adequate 
accountability of managers. Government nevertheless stumbled into and through privatization. 
Some form of regulation was clearly needed since many of the privatized entities such as the 
utilities were monopolies, but the Office of Fair Trading (the competition authority) found the task 
too daunting, and the US regulatory commission model of `juridified constitutionalism’ was 
rejected as unduly bureaucratic. Resistance to change ensured the persistence of many elements of 
the club model, and the individual regulators were initially given broad discretion with little public 
accountability, shielded from politics behind their status as experts. However, this `expert’ 
decision-making depended on access to information, which the industry managers could control 
and contest, resulting in conflicts which inevitably became politicized.  
This has led to an increasingly formalized regulatory system, with a fragmented but loosely 
coordinated epistemic community of regulators, whose mainly private negotiations with corporate 
managers are periodically brought to public attention by a drama or crisis. It has proved very 
difficult to design an adequate institutional framework enabling public debate of key issues such as 
the extent of public service obligations and the proper scope of competition, due to the substantial 
reliance on technocratic legitimation. In telecommunications, the public regulator has been 
criticized for slowness in requiring the privatized telephone company BT to give its competitors 
access to its fixed-line network. In the case of the railways, the public regulator-private operator 
split broke down due to the crisis over safety standards dramatized by successive rail crashes in 
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2000-1, leading to the establishment of a new type of body in Network Rail. This is a `public 
interest company’ supposed to `operate on a sound commercial basis’, with instead of shareholders 
members representing both the rail industry and the public interest (Darling 2002). Similarly, 
hospitals within the National Health Service are now being organized under Foundation Trusts, a 
`strange creation that sits part way between the traditional public and private sectors [and] …  
operate as free standing, not-for-profit businesses’ (Timmins 2006). They are licensed and 
supervised by Monitor, a regulator set up as an independent corporate body, and some of their 
Governors are elected by local residents who may join as ordinary members. Postal services are 
regulated by the Postal Services Commission, which tries to maintain a balance between the Royal 
Mail (still state-owned) and private operators, through licensing, price controls, quality standards 
and network access obligations. 
Global Regulatory Networks 
As Moran also emphasises, the difficulties facing the transformation of the British state have been 
exacerbated since it also resulted from the pressures of renewed globalization. Thus, the very 
machine which was used to used to push through the drastic restructurings, the strong 
parliamentary central government, was itself becoming `hollowed out’, with the transfer of 
significant powers upwards to Brussels, and downwards to Edinburgh and Cardiff. Similarly in 
other countries, various types of national corporate-state arrangements have also been undermined, 
although they have followed different trajectories. The relatively formal neo-corporatist 
institutions which in some countries, especially in continental Europe, tied governments, business 
and trade unions together in bargaining over wage rates and macro-economic policy could not 
easily be maintained in a more competitive and fluid world economy.  
The attempt to recreate institutions to represent `organized interests’ at the regional level in Europe 
also failed (Schmitter & Streek 1991, Greenwood 1992). Instead, the EU has evolved into a 
paradigm of networked governance. From the 1980s, the earlier impetus to supranationalism and 
integration gave way to the `new approach’ to harmonization of technical regulations (Joerges 
1990, Dehousse 1992, Woolcock 1996). This aimed to reduce the role of European legislation to 
the setting of minimum essential requirements, based as far as possible on performance, leaving it 
to technical organizations (public, private or hybrid, but anyway usually dominated by industry 
experts) to specify detailed standards. To complement this, the European Court of Justice 
developed the principles of mutual recognition and equivalence of standards, to prevent national 
regulations from acting as a barrier to imports. Nevertheless, the management of the complex 
interaction of regulation has spawned the growth of comitology (Joerges & Vos 1999), leading to 
what has been described as the networked state (Castells 1998) or networked governance (Kohler-
Koch and Eising 1999). 
Hence, as suggested at the beginning of this section, the changes in the public and private spheres 
and in their interaction also have an international dimension. Economic liberalization has further 
exacerbated the pressures on the political sphere, which have led to its increased fragmentation 
and the growth of new regulatory forms. The new types of hybrid public-private regulatory 
networks often develop in response to the need to govern economic activities that are increasingly 
internationally integrated and yet take place in very dispersed and diverse geographic and cultural 
contexts.  
Indeed, public functions may more easily be provided in the global sphere by private bodies. They 
nevertheless face the dual difficulties of partiality towards specific private interests and power-
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political interference by governments. Two paradigmatic instances may serve as illustrations: 
international financial markets, and the internet.  
The liberalization of financial flows has certainly created an internationally integrated financial 
system, but it consists of a maze of networks involving banks and other financial firms, 
organizations such as exchanges and clearing houses, specialist traders of many kinds, and 
professionals such as lawyers, with both private associations and public bodies playing regulatory 
and supervisory roles. Financial markets and transactions are in fact highly regulated, but a large 
amount of this regulation is generated by and among market participants themselves (Abolafia 
1985). For example, the terms of complex transactions in financial derivatives are governed by the 
standard Agreements drawn up by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association.1 Perhaps 
better known is the important role of rating agencies such as Moody’s and Standard & Poors in 
evaluating the credit-worthiness of bond issuers, not only private firms but governments (Sinclair 
1999).2  
Of course, such private regulation is not autonomous, but intersects with more public forms of 
supervision and control. However, as Tony Porter has argued, international public institutional 
arrangements have generally been developed only when private governance is absent or weak 
(Porter 1993).3 Even then, it often takes the form of `meta-regulation’, or the supervision of the 
adequacy of private regulation.4 Thus, for example, the capital adequacy standards developed by 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) have been refined in the so-called Basel II 
Capital Adequacy Framework which is now being introduced. The BCBS still maintains its basic 
rule of an 8% ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets, as well as its general standards on definition 
of capital. However, the new approach in Basel II allows each bank to decide its own risk 
management system (which are generally based on well-known models), provided it meets 
specified minimum requirements, and subject to review by the local supervisor of the bank’s 
systems and controls (BCBS 2005, 2). Thus, the BCBS essentially acts as a node of coordination 
in a network of public-private regulatory arrangements.  
Like financial markets, the internet, although highly decentralized and apparently anarchic, is in 
fact a highly ordered system. Also in somewhat similar fashion to finance, the development of the 
internet has been substantially driven by the formulation of norms and standards by non-official 
groups, networks and institutions.5 Probably most successful has been the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF), which has been responsible for developing the technical standards that enable 
                                                  
1 ISDA: see www.isda.org. 
2 A good example of private regulation of the public analyzed by Scott (2002) as discussed above. 
3 This is the reverse side of Colin Scott’s point, referred to above, that private governance may emerge when the state 
retreats. 
4 The term `meta-regulation’ has been applied to national state laws which lay down overarching requirements or 
standards (for example, for environmental protection) with which more specific industry or corporate codes are 
expected to comply (Gunningham & Grabosky 1998, Parker 2002). This term has been extended to apply to describe 
the `disciplines’ laid down by WTO law on national states by Bronwen Morgan (2003), who has described WTO rules 
as `global meta-regulation’, or rules prescribing how states should regulate. 
5 Even though, as is well known, the internet began as a US military project: for further details see Leiner et al. 2003.  
 8 
the internet to function and grow. The IETF itself developed in an entirely unplanned way, as a 
network of specialists, who evolved very non-bureaucratic methods of cooperation, based on 
principles which later became clarified as: open process, volunteer participation, technical 
competence, consensual and practical decision-making, and responsibility.6  
Of course, this work has been greatly facilitated because its subject-matter is specialist and the 
participants may be said to share a common commitment and understandings and hence form an 
`epistemic community’ (Haas 1992). However, as Michael Froomkin points out in his fascinating 
analysis of the IETF and internet regulation (Froomkin 2003), the commitment of the IETF 
community is not to a closed apolitical technicist task, but to the much broader normative value of 
ubiquitous global communication (ibid. 810-811). He contrasts the IETF with another key body, 
ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers). ICANN was also set up as a 
private entity, although at the suggestion of the US government, to take over from the IETF the 
task of managing internet domain names, and it claimed to model its procedures on those of the 
IETF. However, Froomkin demonstrates that in practice ICANN’s methods have been closed and 
secretive rather than open, and its decisions made by fiat rather than consensus (ibid. 838ff., esp. 
852-3), resulting in severe legitimation problems. This he attributes to the greater political and 
especially economic contentiousness of the subject-matter, as well as ICANN’s institutional design 
failures.  
3. REGULATORY INTERACTIONS IN MULTILAYERED NETWORK GOVERNANCE 
The previous section has sketched out the tensions in the classical liberal state system which has 
led to its fragmentation, involving both changes in the nature and interaction of the private and 
public, and the shift towards networked international coordination. This section will look more 
closely at three major features of these international regulatory networks. 
The Destabilization of Regulatory Hierarchy 
The `network’ metaphor attempts to capture this central feature of governance which distinguishes 
the post-liberal from the classical liberal system. In the latter, legal rules fell into relatively clear 
categories and hierarchies, with international law binding states, and national or local law 
governing legal persons. This made it possible, at least in principle, to determine the validity of 
rules and to decide which should apply to a particular transaction or activity. In networked 
governance, the determination of the legitimacy of an activity under any one system of norms is 
rarely definitive, it can usually be challenged by reference to another system. Indeed, normative 
systems overlap and inter-penetrate each other. Also, the fragmentation of the public sphere 
sometimes involves the creation of largely private arenas to which only the more privileged or 
powerful economic actors have access, resulting in a kind of privatization of justice. 
Thus, international law now includes supranational law, which may have direct applicability to 
legal persons. However, this possibility is not definitive, since the interaction is often 
indeterminate or problematic. The most developed supranational law is EC law, which was greatly 
expanded by the ECJ’s development of the jurisprudence of `direct effect’ of some treaty 
                                                  
6 See “A  Mission Statement for the IETF”, Request for Comments 3935, October 2004; available from 
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3935.txt, accessed 15/2/2005. 
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provisions and Directives (which formally are addressed to states not legal persons). Yet managing 
these interactions depends on accommodations between the national-level authorities and courts 
and those at the EU level, as shown for example in the German Constitutional Court’s reservation 
of Kompetenz-Kompetenz in its famous Maastrichturteil (Weiler 1995, MacCormick 1995). 
Importantly, the supranational character of EC law gives private parties (especially firms) a legal 
basis to challenge national laws and administrative practices which might limit the market 
freedoms enshrined in EC law. 
Supranational law is much less developed globally, at least from the formal viewpoint. Notably, 
states have taken care to insist that WTO law does not have direct applicability as part of national 
law.7 Nevertheless, the WTO’s rules impose sweeping obligations (or in WTO-speak `disciplines’) 
with which national measures must comply. This compliance is ensured both by elaborate 
monitoring procedures through the WTO’s Committees, and in the final resort by binding 
adjudication through the WTO’s powerful Dispute-Settlement Procedure. Although this is 
formally a state-state procedure, the two most powerful trade blocs have established procedures to 
give (some) private entities procedural rights to invoke WTO law at national level: in the USA 
under section 301 of the Trade Act, and in the EC under the Trade Barrier Regulation. These 
create what has been described as a system of public-private partnerships, so that `WTO law, 
while formally a domain of public international law, profits and prejudices private parties’ 
(Shaffer 2003, 3).  
An even starker example of the carving out of a specific and privileged jurisdictional arena is 
provided by international investment or market liberalization agreements.8 These give `investors’ 
(essentially TNCs) a direct right of access to international arbitration if they consider that national 
laws or administration have contravened the broad non-discrimination and property-protection 
provisions of the treaty. This basically enables the private rights of a legal person to be used to 
challenge the public policy decisions of government and state bodies, using secretive procedures 
modelled on private commercial arbitration. The effect is to destabilize the legitimacy of national 
laws, even if the outcomes of such arbitrations rarely override national law in any definitive way. 
The threat of such a claim, which could lead to an award which may run to hundreds of millions of 
dollars, as well as the cost of defending it, gives foreign investors a powerful weapon especially 
against poor states.9 This grant by states to private parties of a right to international arbitration acts 
                                                  
7 The WTO Agreement, art. XVI.4, requires each member state `to ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and 
administrative procedures with its [WTO] obligations'. However, WTO rules are not generally considered to be 
`supranational', i.e. to have direct effect as national law (Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Mavroidis, ch.5).  
8 The main type are Bilateral Investment Agreements (BITs), which have been used since 1959, but have developed 
into a much more widespread network since the 1990s (UNCTAD 2000). The North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), a multilateral agreement between Canada, Mexico and the USA, includes a strong version of such a treaty 
as its Chapter XI. An attempt to negotiate an ambitious Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) through the 
OECD collapsed in 1998 (Picciotto & Mayne, 1999). 
9 From 1987 to the end of 2005 some 219 such cases are reported to have been formally initiated, although the number 
is likely to be understated since there is no obligation to publish complaints. Over 40 of these have been against 
Argentina, mostly claiming compensation for losses resulting from its decision to abandon the link of the peso with 
the dollar; so far one of these has been successful, resulting in an award of $133m, although the Argentine government 
is attempting to block the award (UNCTAD 2005). On the other hand, a private tribunal rejected a $970m claim 
brought against the USA by Methanex, a Canadian company, alleging that Californian gasoline regulations 
discriminated against methanol which it produced. Cases may be affected by political controversy: for example, Aguas 
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in effect as a governance mechanism, in which private rights, enforced by an extension of the 
private procedure of commercial arbitration, may override formal state law (Van Harten 2005). 
There has also been a growth of what may be called infra-state regulation, legal and quasi-legal 
regulatory arrangements, involving both public and private, as well as hybrid, bodies. For 
example, tax authorities in the main OECD countries have developed procedures for the 
coordination of taxation of related members of corporate groups (TNCs). These operate under 
provisions in bilateral tax treaties which authorize information exchange, as well as consultations 
between the `competent authorities’, for the purposes of ensuring that taxation is in accordance 
with the treaty. These procedures enable international consultations between the two (or 
sometimes more) tax authorities and the TNC (or its advisers, usually the large accountancy 
firms), in particular to debate and negotiate the methodology each firm uses for setting transfer 
prices for goods and services supplied between its constituent parts. Agreements between the 
competent authorities, which may relate to individual cases or to more general issues of 
interpretation of the treaty, have an ambiguous legal status: they may be treated as no more than a 
statement of intent by and between administrative authorities, although a good argument can be 
made that they are binding international agreements (Picciotto 1992, 297-9). They clearly have a 
very hybrid character, with elements of public and private, national and international law. 
A major destabilizing factor is the creation of jurisdictions of convenience or `havens’. These 
entail a kind of privatization of sovereignty (Palan 2002), in which a legal enclave offering 
privileges for certain types of private business is created, often designed by lawyers acting as 
intermediaries between government and private interests. These aim to provide the beneficiaries 
with a legal refuge or protection from the laws of other states, without needing to relocate in any 
real sense since they can use the legal fictions of corporations or trusts. Thus, `flags of 
convenience’, which originated in the 1920s to avoid US liquor prohibition laws, have enabled a 
large proportion of international shipping to avoid many types of regulation (especially taxation), 
and to choose the jurisdiction they consider most favourable. The flag states essentially offer a 
ship registration service, the administration of which may have little or no physical contact with 
the state itself, being sub-contracted to private firms. Notably, the Liberian International Ship and 
Corporate Registry is run from Vienna, Virginia USA, which made it possible to continue 
operation uninterrupted, despite the turbulence and civil war in Liberia which incapacitated the 
government of that country for a long period. The actual surveys and the issuing of safety 
                                                                                                                                                                  
del Tunari, a majority foreign-owned firm which had been awarded a concession to run privatized water services in 
Cochabamba, Bolivia, brought a claim for compensation for cancellation of the concession due to strong local 
opposition to the privatization and the consequent sharp increases in water charges; in January 2006 the claim was 
reported to have been withdrawn, although the firm had won the initial jurisdictional stage of the dispute. This was a 
controversial decision, since by a 2-1 majority the tribunal accepted that the complaint could be brought under the 
Bolivia-Netherlands investment treaty, even though the main investor was the US firm Bechtel, which created a 
Netherlands holding company as part of a financial restructuring and for tax reasons following the grant of the 
concession. This decision, in common with others brought through the World Bank’s International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) can be found at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/. An excellent 
source is Investment Treaty News produced by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) 
available at http://www.iisd.org/investment/itn/. 
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certificates for ships are done by recognized private classification societies, including the 
American Bureau of Shipping and Lloyd’s Register of Shipping.10  
Due to long-standing concerns about the safety standards of such `open registries’, led by a long-
running campaign by the International Transport Federation (ITF) of trade unions, regulatory 
networks have emerged to try to deal with low-standard ships and registries, or `flags of 
convenience’. A key development has been cooperation between the maritime authorities of Port 
States. They now deploy sophisticated inspection systems, based on checklists of internationally-
agreed standards, deficiency reporting, a computerised database, and the possibility of detention.11 
Thus, the seaworthiness and employment conditions of ships are governed by a variety of 
regulatory bodies, both public and private, national and international. None of them have definitive 
jurisdiction, although port authorities can apply the ultimate sanction of detention (Couper et al. 
1999, Gerstenberger 2002). 
As these examples show, networked governance disrupts the channels of democratic 
accountability, which in the classical liberal system are through national constitutional structures, 
ideally parliamentary representative democracy. A number of suggestions have been made to help 
structure global governance arenas in ways that can facilitate democratic deliberation, insulated as 
far as possible from private or special interests, and based on principles of accountability, 
transparency, responsibility, and above all empowerment (Picciotto 2001). This does not mean 
abandoning existing democratic structures, but suggests that they must be complemented by 
ensuring transparency and accountability of all arenas and actors playing a regulatory role.  
The Blurring of Distinctions between Normative Forms 
A corollary of the erosion of the hierarchical norm structure of classical liberalism has been both 
the erosion of the public-private law distinction (discussed already above), and a shift from formal 
law to quasi-legal forms of regulation in global arenas. These are generally referred to as `soft 
law’, as opposed to formal `hard law’, and include a wide range of types, such as codes, 
guidelines, declarations, sets of principles, and memorandums of understanding (MOUs).12 
Although not binding law, in practice they often have considerable normative force, as much or 
more than does `hard’ international law, which in any case mainly relies on consensual rather than 
coerced compliance. 
Such soft law forms may be used in inter-state agreements, which often take the form of 
declarations or `proclamations’, for example the principles of sustainable development, announced 
at the conclusion of major international conferences from Stockholm in 1972, to Rio in 1992 and 
Johannesburg in 2002. From a formal lawyer’s viewpoint they may seem to consist of no more 
                                                  
10 See http://www.liscr.com/. Ten such bodies have formed the International Association of Classification Societies' 
(IACS), which in December 2005 adopted a set of Common Structural Rules for ship classification and approval, see 
http://www.iacs.org.uk/csr/index.html. 
11 The first was established by 20 maritime authorities covering Europe and the north Atlantic, based on the Paris 
MOU (Memorandum of Understanding), for details see http://www.parismou.org. This has been followed by Asia-
Pacific, Caribbean and Latin American groups. 
12 See generally Shelton 2000. 
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than fine-sounding rhetoric. However, they are linked to action programmes (in particular `Agenda 
21’ adopted at Rio), and their principles may be given substantive effect,13 or lead to more specific 
hard-law instruments.14 Sometimes, this type of instrument is chosen to emphasise the aspirational 
character of the norms, as with the ILO’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work, the adoption of which was strongly resisted by the governments of some developing 
countries. Its impact therefore greatly depends on the effectiveness of the procedures for 
encouraging and monitoring compliance (Hepple 1999). These may be quite rigorous, for example 
the implementation of the Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has been 
very closely monitored, through `peer-review’ procedures, and `naming and shaming’ jurisdictions 
which fail to meet the standards.  
Secondly, Codes and Guidelines have been developed since the late 1960s to establish standards at 
the international level addressed directly to firms. Here again, a non-binding form is often 
deliberately chosen, yet the implementation in practice could be rigorous (though often has not 
been), and could involve adoption or transformation of the soft law norms into hard law. For 
example, the Baby-Milk Marketing Code adopted as a Recommendation by the WHO in 1981 has 
been used as a basis for national legislation in a number of countries, although the main pressure 
for compliance has come from a sustained and vigorous international campaign.15 In the 1990s, 
following a decade or more of pressures by business on states to reduce regulation and dismantle 
barriers to market access, TNCs themselves began to introduce corporate Codes of Conduct in 
order to reassure customers and other stakeholders of their adherence to international standards of 
social and environmental responsibility (Haufler 2001, Jenkins et al. 2002). Firms have generally 
preferred `voluntary’ codes, stressing the need for flexibility to adapt the norms to the specific 
characteristics of the business, and the desirability of raising standards by encouragement and self-
generated commitment, as opposed to the rigidity and instrumentalism of externally-imposed and 
bureaucratically-enforced law. Corporate critics and sceptics have countered by challenging the 
effectiveness of self-selected and self-monitored standards, and have argued that competitive 
equality requires generally-applicable rules rather than self-selected codes. However, on closer 
examination it becomes clear that the sharp distinction between voluntary codes and binding law is 
inaccurate: codes entail a degree of formalization of normative expectations and practices, and 
may be linked to formal law, both public and private, in various complex ways which may be 
described as a `tangled web’ (Webb and Morrison 2004), so the question is how they should be 
articulated (Picciotto 2003). 
                                                  
13 Thus, the Appellate Body of the WTO, in its important decision in the Shrimp-Turtle case (1998), in interpreting the 
provisions of the WTO agreements, took account of the reference to the principle of sustainable development and to 
the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 in the WTO Agreement and the WTO Council’s Decision on Trade and 
Environment. 
14 For example, the Montreal Protocol on Substances Depleting the Ozone Layer, and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity. 
15 A key role has been played by the International Baby Food Action Network (IBFAN) which is a grassroots-based 
non-governmental organization (NGO), although it has received substantial support from UNICEF. Details on the 
monitoring of compliance with the Code may be found on its website www.ibfan.org. The early history of this Code 
was recounted by Chetley 1986, and a more recent account of corporate codes which deals with it in detail is Richter 
2001. 
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Finally, the growth of international regulatory networks linking public bodies at `sub-state’ level 
has involved the use of novel forms of agreement, especially the MOU. These are often very 
specific and establish detailed arrangements: for example there is a network of MOUs between 
regulators of financial markets and exchanges for cooperation in information exchange and other 
enforcement activities.16 These also may be stated to be `non-binding’ although in practice 
compliance may be very effective. In this case, the formally non-binding character is because it is 
often not clear whether they fall under national or international, public or private law. Under 
international law, sub-state or non-state bodies are not considered to have the capacity to bind the 
state or government concerned.17 In some cases they may be regarded simply as `private’ 
contracts, if the parties are legal persons: for example, agreements between stock exchanges or 
futures markets to enable reciprocal trading of products or cooperate in market monitoring and 
enforcement. Yet they may have a very hybrid character, as with the international tax `competent 
authority agreements’ discussed above. Equally, agreements which take the form of private 
contracts may be more appropriately regarded as quasi-public, such as the international 
construction contracts analyzed by Oren Perez (Perez 2002, 2004). 
Generally, the growth of soft law and the blurring of the public-private law divide indicates that 
the range and depth of international normative coordination no longer fits within the classical 
liberal model of agreements negotiated by central governments on behalf of states (Reinicke and 
Witt 2000). Soft law allows regulatory regimes to be developed and applied directly by those 
involved, rather than through diplomatic channels and foreign offices,18 and for them to involve a 
wider range of participants regardless of their formal status as state, public, or private entities. Soft 
law is not necessarily fuzzy or vague, it is often specialized and detailed;19 but it does provide 
greater flexibility for adaptation to change. Equally, it may be ad hoc or particularistic, and lack 
independent mechanisms for ensuring and monitoring compliance.  
Functional Fragmentation, Technicization and Legitimacy 
The fragmentation of statehood and the transfer of specific functions to relatively autonomous 
public bodies is also a further extension of the process of technicization in the modern state. In the 
traditional Weberian perspective, technocracy is seen as a means merely of implementing policies 
which have been formulated through political processes. From this viewpoint, the growth of 
                                                  
16 These grew on a bilateral basis in the 1980s, but became coordinated through the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), in which the public supervisory authorities agreed the Boca Declaration of 1996, 
which is intended to augment the MOUs agreed between the (private) exchanges themselves; the Boca Declaration 
and the lists of MOUs between supervisory authorities are available on the IOSCO website at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?section=mou. 
17 As noted in a leading text on the law of treaties (McNair 1961, 21), the proliferation of agreements between 
subordinate state agencies, and the great variation in the relationship of such bodies to the central government, makes 
it hard to determine when such an agreement could be considered to be internationally binding. 
18 However, foreign offices also recognize the need for soft law such as MOUs, to provide a less formal and more 
flexible means of dealing with detailed and technical matters, or perhaps to provide confidentiality, for example in 
defence matters (Aust 2000, ch. 3). 
19 I disagree on this point with Abbott and Snidal (2000), who suggest that soft law tends to be less detailed; this rests 
on their initial definition of `legalization’ with which I also disagree (see further below). 
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delegation to specialist regulators is a response to the problems of governing increasingly complex 
societies, by giving greater autonomy to technocratic decision-makers within a policy framework 
set by government. However, the new forms of governance are more decentralized and interactive, 
which further exacerbates the legitimacy problems which Weber already identified with the `iron 
cage’ of bureaucracy when it loses its accountability to social values. 
Indeed, functional fragmentation may also be seen as reflecting the broader changes in the nature 
and relationship of the `public' and the `private' sphere which we have been discussing. The 
transfer of specific public functions to what have been described as `non-majoritarian’ regulators 
(Coen & Thatcher 2005) is often justified in terms of the need to insulate some areas of decision-
making from influence by private special interests and the short-term considerations which 
dominate electoral politics. Hence, it also reflects changes in political processes, with the 
breakdown of representative government, which `public choice’ theorists have argued is prone to 
capture by private interests (Buchanan & Tollison 1984). In place of party-democracy there has 
been the emergence of what Bernard Manin has called `audience democracy' (Manin 1997), 
increasingly based on populist forms of political mobilization. This in turn poses the question of 
whether the decentralization or fragmentation of hierarchical government based on formal or 
instrumental rationality, and the shift to networked governance requiring reflexive interactions and 
based on communicative rationality, may offer a basis for new forms of deliberative or discursive 
democracy (Dryzek 1990, 1999). The changes in public-private interactions discussed above make 
it vital to find ways to remodel the sphere of political debate and decision-making. Central to this 
are questions about the nature of technocratic governance and the basis of its legitimacy. 
This is especially relevant to global governance, since much of the activity of international 
regulatory networks has been generated by technical specialists or `epistemic communities’. This 
concept was developed within a neo-functionalist paradigm, to suggest that a stronger basis for 
international cooperation may be provided by delegating specific issues to be dealt with in a 
depoliticized manner by specialists deploying scientific, managerial or professional techniques and 
working within shared universal discourses (Haas 1992). This concept seemed to maintain the 
Weberian assumption that broad policy goals should be decided politically, so that the delegation 
should be of practical details of implementation, facilitating the resolution of global policy issues 
by `narrowing the range within which political bargains could be struck’ (Haas 1992, 378). From 
this perspective governance networks could be said to strengthen the liberal state system, since 
they simply entail cooperation between government officials, who can be held accountable by 
citizens through national state mechanisms (Slaughter 1997).  
There is certainly evidence that global expert action networks have been extremely effective in 
mobilizing and sustaining global governance regimes, for example Canan and Reichman’s 
sociological study of the `global community’ of environmental experts and activists which formed 
around the Montreal Protocol (2002). Far from being depoliticized, however, such networks often 
include activists as well as technical specialists; and even if the issues are specialized, the 
participants share common social values. This seems to be the case, for example, with the 
computer scientists of the IETF who have developed and maintained internet standards, discussed 
above. The contribution of technical specialists to international diplomacy is often to help gain 
acceptance for proposals which are put forward as objective and scientific, although actually 
carefully calibrated for political acceptability. Indeed, even some liberals such as Anne-Marie 
Slaughter now seem to concede that global governance networks do raise some accountability 
 15 
problems, which perhaps requires them to operate as `a kind of disaggregated global democracy 
based on individual and group self-governance’ (Slaughter 2004, 240). 
In this context, the importance of expertise suggests that the dangers of technicism must be 
addressed. This is especially the case since so many decisions now entail inputs often from 
different specialist or expert fields, as well as an evaluation from the general public perspective. 
Technical rationality can operate in an autocratic way, if it seeks to claim a spurious authority. 
This can be counter-productive, as has occurred in the frequent episodes when it has resulted in a 
spiral of public mistrust of science, and scientists’ despair at public ignorance. To avoid 
technicism, specialists need to acknowledge the ways in which their techniques rest on formal 
models based on assumptions which allow them to abstract the specific aspects of an issue or the 
data with which they are concerned from the entirety and complexity of the issue in the real world. 
Since the conclusions they can reach based on such assumptions can only have a partial or 
conditional validity, they should not be treated as determinative of the issue as a whole, but as 
important contribution towards more general public debates. Scientific responsibility should 
therefore include cognitive openness and reflexivity (Dryzek 1990, 1999).20 
4. THE ROLE OF LAW AND LAWYERS IN GLOBAL REGULATORY NETWORKS 
The law and lawyers have played a major role in the construction and management of these 
globalized regulatory networks. However, this has been analyzed in very different ways. 
One influential group of American commentators have discussed the legalization of world politics 
from an essentially Weberian perspective. They assess the extent of legalization along a spectrum 
according to three criteria: being based on rules which are regarded as binding, which are precise, 
and the interpretation of which has been delegated to a third party adjudicator (Abbott, Keohane et 
al., 404-6). This essentially limits law to formal state law, excluding any hybrid or private forms of 
governance, and has been criticized as taking a narrow view of law (Finnemore and Toope ). As 
already mentioned above, the view that `hard’ law provides precise rules, while quasi-legal `soft’ 
law is more vague or imprecise, does not stand up to empirical analysis. For example, financial 
market regulations discussed above, whether developed by private bodies such as the ISDA or 
public ones such as the BCBS, are as detailed as any legislation, but they are formally `soft’ law. 
On the other hand, from the formalist viewpoint, the WTO agreements rate highly as exemplars of 
legalization, since they lay down an enormous quantity of formally binding rules, the 
interpretation of which has been delegated to the WTO’s Appellate Body (AB) as an adjudicator. 
However, the suggestion that these rules are precise and unambiguous is highly dubious, and it can 
be shown that both the general structure and many of the specific provisions of the WTO 
agreements raise issues of interpretation which were known to be highly contestable, and indeed 
were being contested, in the period when the texts were negotiated and agreed (Alter 2003, 
Picciotto 2005). Furthermore, this perspective fails to capture the multiple forms and roles of law 
in the multi-level system described and analyzed above, nor the mode of the interaction. 
                                                  
20 Michael Froomkin has provided an interesting account and analysis of the governance of the Internet (mentioned 
already above), suggesting that the success of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in terms of both efficacy 
and legitimacy was due largely to its essentially democratic participative procedures, which he argues is an exemplar 
of Habermasian practical discourse ethics; in contrast, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN) suffered a legitimation crisis, because its operations were secretive and claimed legitimacy from a rigid 
corporatist representation system (Froomkin 2003). 
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In contrast, the heterarchical character of regulatory networks has led some theorists to revive 
concepts of legal pluralism (e.g. Snyder 2000), building on the challenge by earlier versions of 
legal pluralism to the privileging of state law in the classical liberal paradigm. However, while 
pluralism may help in drawing attention to the existence and interactions of multiple legal orders, 
it is prone to the criticism advanced by von Benda-Beckmann that `talking of intertwining, 
interaction or mutual constitution presupposes distinguishing what is being intertwined’ (cited in 
Melissaris 2004, 61).  
The most sophisticated and complex attempt to establish a conceptual analysis which incorporates 
a pluralist approach has been that of Santos (1987, 1995). He distinguishes his perspective from 
that of traditional legal anthropology which conceived different legal orders as `separate entities 
coexisting in the same political space’, and cogently argues that `[w]e live in a time of porous 
legality or legal porosity, of multiple networks of legal orders forcing us to constant transitions and 
trespassings. Our legal life is constituted by an intersection of different legal orders, that is by 
interlegality’ (Santos 1995, 473). He suggests that the new legal pluralism is concerned with `the 
identification of the three time-spaces of the legal field - the local, the national, and the 
transnational’ (ibid. 117), and uses the metaphor of cartography to suggest that different types of 
laws are based on different scales, projections and symbolizations, and that social groups become 
more adept in the types of action suited to the legal order within which they are predominantly 
socialized (ibid. 465-6). However, his analysis tends to be structural: he conceives of different 
legal orders as overlapping but mutually exclusive and that `each legal construction has an internal 
coherence’ (ibid. 473), rather than being internally contradictory. In particular, he argues that the 
new lex mercatoria and the proliferation of business and corporate codes constitute `the 
emergence of new legal particularisms’ which `create a transnational legal space that often 
conflicts with national state legal space’ (ibid. 469). Thus, Santos perhaps does not fully exploit 
the concepts of porosity and interlegality, nor does he explore how legal techniques can be used 
strategically, and can help to manage the interactions of different arenas and forms of law. 
Analysts of regulation have attempted to capture the characteristics of different layers of 
regulation and their interaction, notably with the concept of `meta-regulation’, discussed above. 
This kind of approach to regulatory interactions is based in concepts of responsive or reflexive 
law. As part of the response to the crises of the welfare state, Nonet and Selznick put forward a 
new modernist paradigm of responsive law, as an evolution from the repressive and autonomous 
phases of law, and envisaging regulation as an interactive process of developing methods to realize 
purposes expressed through law and thereby clarifying the public interest (Nonet and Selznick 
1978/2001). The concept was taken up in regulation theory notably by Ayres and Braithwaite 
(1992), seeking to reassert a civic republican tradition in which the layers of social institutions, 
from the state through industry associations and down to individual corporations, play their 
different parts in social regulation,21 lubricated by a two-way flow of public discourse.  
An alternative analysis was offered by Gunther Teubner, who argued that the emergence of 
reflexivity in modern law resulted from the `trilemma’ created by the increased legalization or 
                                                  
21 Sub-titled Transcending the Deregulation Debate, the book sought to reconcile the growth of regulation with a 
reduced role for the state by arguing for an `enforcement pyramid’ (a concept which Braithwaite has consistently 
championed across many fields of regulation), in which the state should speak softly and carry a variety of both big 
and smaller sticks.  
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juridification of the social sphere (Teubner 1983, 1987). For Teubner it is the autonomy of the 
legal field that generates its autopoeitic self-referentiality, but the politicization resulting from 
increased application of law into social fields creates expectations which require 
instrumentalization, perhaps through new forms of self-regulation. The pressure for legal 
regulation to go beyond the limits possible through the autonomous logics of self-reproduction 
means that it either lapses into irrelevance, or results in disintegration either of the social field to 
which it is applied or of the law itself, so that regulatory failure is the rule rather than the 
exception. Thus, in his work on globalization he welcomes the potential it offers for law to become 
more detached from the political sphere of states, and instead to institutionalise constitutions for 
autonomous social sectors and the norms which they generate, which he suggests could enable 
new forms of repoliticization (Teubner 2004). He rightly criticises the view of globalization as an 
economic process which reduces the prospects of regulation through law, and points to the many 
new normative forms underpinning globalization, which seek validation through law. However, 
this systems-theoretical perspective perhaps overstates the autonomy of the ill-defined social sub-
systems, and the self-referential nature of `neo-spontaneous’ generation of `global law without a 
state’, of which lex mercatoria is given as an example (Teubner 1997).  
Rather, lex mercatoria demonstrates how law may mediate transformations of both the `private’ 
sphere of economic activity and the `public’ sphere of politics, and their interaction. This is 
explored in the extensive sociological research of Dezalay and Garth, which reveals that the 
concept of lex mercatoria was a strategic move in the competitive struggles between arbitration 
centres, in which lawyers mediated skilfully between the spheres of political and corporate power 
to create the new arena of international commercial arbitration (Dezalay and Garth 1995, 1996). 
Certainly, the learned doctrine of lex mercatoria, backed by the neutral authority of the grand 
European professors which validated it in the eyes of their disciples in the third world, helped to 
provide a `middle way’ in the postcolonial clashes over the scope of state sovereignty, especially 
concerning the control of oil; but in practice the legal arbitrations were only one strand (and a 
minor one) in the broader political negotiations (Dezalay & Garth 1995: 83-91, 313). Rather than 
creating a purely private legal sphere outside the realm of state law, the two have been deeply 
entangled, and the authority of law, especially legal concepts of private rights, has been used to 
counter political notions of state sovereignty in the struggles to reconfigure economic and political 
power. Thus, as suggested above, it is essential to understand these shifting forms of governance 
as resulting from strategic moves in contests of power.  
A more actor-oriented approach is take by Bourdieu, who criticizes the confusion in systems 
theory between the symbolic structures of the law and the objective orders of the legal and other 
professional fields, in which agents and institutions compete for the right to formulate the rules, `le 
droit de dire le droit’ (Bourdieu 1986). This is perhaps especially valuable in providing a basis for 
empirical and sociological studies of the actual practices of lawyering, centring on the practices of 
interpretation of legal texts, which involves the appropriation of the `symbolic power which is 
potentially contained within the text’, in terms of competitive struggles to `control’ the legal text 
(Bourdieu 1987: 818).22  
                                                  
22 He suggests that coherence emerges partly through the social organization of the field, and partly because to 
succeed competing interpretations must be presented `as the necessary result of a principled interpretation of 
unanimously accepted texts’ (ibid. ). This explains the apparent paradox that, while lawyers spend much of their time 
disagreeing about the meaning of texts, they often do so from an objectivist perspective. They generally deny that 
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I suggest that a clearer understanding of regulatory networks, and of the role in them of law, 
comes from dislodging positivist and instrumentalist views of law. Legalization has certainly been 
an important feature of the management of economic globalization. Under a formalist view of law, 
legitimacy is thought to be provided by law because it offers a process for decision-making which 
is technical-rational: a logical application of precise or unambiguous rules prescribing obligatory 
conduct, to implement politically-determined aims (Abbott et al.). Yet the interpretation and 
application of legal rules is not a mechanistic but a flexible process, which allows scope for the 
overt or covert consideration of social, political and cultural factors, and adaptation to 
circumstances. 
Law therefore plays a key role in global governance not because of its precision, but its flexibility. 
This provides a possibility to help to accommodate the diversity of local and national social and 
cultural particularities to the increasingly globally integrated world market, and to manage 
conflicts resulting from power disparities (Picciotto 1997, 266). However, its failures and crises, of 
which there are many, result from the design failures which attempt to substitute the legitimacy of 
formal legal rationality for the political and social legitimacy (and efficacity) which can only come 
from a broader democratic structures. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has argued that the far-reaching changes in both the sphere of politics and that of the 
economy have further eroded the distinction between the public and private. The transition to a 
new form of statehood, described as networked governance, certainly poses new political 
challenges. However, it would be illusory once again to attempt the separation of public and 
private. What is needed is to develop modes of interaction which can more effectively ensure the 
primacy of public over private interests in the management of economic activities generally.  
Law has an important part to play, but it should not be regarded as a separate sphere through 
which public standards are applied to control private interests in otherwise closed arenas. Lawyers 
operate at the interface between state and market, and play a crucial role in accommodating public 
concerns to private interests. Lawyering entails interpretive practices which mediate between the 
public standards and values expressed in the wide variety of norms, and the particular activities 
and operations of economic actors, offering the hope that economic power should be exercised 
ultimately for the general good. However, this expectation is illusory unless law operates within a 
broader democratic framework, in which legal practices themselves are also subject to high 
standards of transparency, accountability and responsibility. 
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